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1956 CONVENTION PROGRAM ISSET
AT BROADMOOR HOTEL
The 58th Annual Convention of The Colorado Bar Association
will be held October 18 through 20, 1956, at the Broadmoor Hotel,
Colorado Springs. The following procedures will be strictly observed in the handling of reservations for this Convention.
1. All requests for reservations must -be sent to the Secretary
of The Colorado Bar Association, 525 Mile High Center, Denver.
2. No block reservations will be recognized, but each member
of the Association desiring reservations must send in his own request by United States mail.
3. Each reservation request must be accompanied by a deposit
of $15. This deposit will not be credited to the hntel hill (the
Broadmoor has a policy against accepting advances on room rent)
but will cover a registration fee of $6 and one ticket each to the
Friday and Saturday luncheons ($2.50 each), the Saturday Night
Banquet ($4), the President's Reception, the Friday night entertainment, and the Grand Ball on Saturdav night.
4. In making your request for accommodations at the Broadmoor, please specify (1) the type of room desired, (2) how many
will be in your party, (3) the dates of arrival and departure.
5. On March 15, 1956, all requests for reservations then in the
Secretary's office will be opened simultaneously. If the total number of requests accompanied by a proper deposit does not exceed
the number of rooms which the Broadmoor can make available,
all will be filled. If such requests exceed the number of rooms
available, the rooms will be allocated to the various local bar associations, pro-rated according to the membership of each association.
Associations having more requests for reservations than rooms assigned may select by lot, or otherwise, the registrants to be approved. Such selection would be made by the local bar association
involved, with the results certified to the Secretary of The Colorado Bar Association.
6. Letters requesting reservations will be sent by the Secretary
to the Broadmoor Hotel when approved in the above manner. The
Hotel will be responsible for the actual assignment of rooms.
7. Deposits will be returned to those not reciving reservations
unless they desire to leave their requests on file in the hope of obtaining a reservation canceled by another. Those leaving their deposits with the Bar Association Secretary will receive preference
in the assigment of canceled reservations.
8. After a reservation is confirmed NO DEPOSIT WILL BE
RETURNED UNLESS A CANCELLATION IS RECEIVED PRIOR
TO SEPTEMBER 15, 1956.
No advance deposit will be required of members who do not
request reservations at the Broadmoor Hotel. Ample accommodations are available elsewhere in Colorado Springs, and the Convention Committee will provide information at a later date to anyone
desiring such facilities.
Requests for accommodations at the Proadmoor Hotel will now
be received by the Bar Association Secretary.
CONVENTION COMMITTEE OF THE COLORADO
BAR ASSOCIATION
Alfred Heinicke, Chairman
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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF COURTS, JUDGMENTS
AND PROCEDURE
By DICK

BERNICK Of

the Denver Bar

The case of Holland v. McAuliffe' dealt with an attack on Denver Ordinance No. 233, Series of 1953. The ordinance gave discretionary power to the municipal court to place a defendant
on conditional suspension of sentence or fine for a period not exceeding two years. In the event the municipal court found the
defendant to have breached the conditions of suspension it was
required to reinstate the original sentence or fine. The ordinance
also prbvided that for purposes of appeal the date of conditional
suspension was to be considered the date of final judgment.
Two months before the ordinance in question became effective
the defendant was given a fine and jail sentence. The Court suspended the jail sentence and part of the fine on condition that
defendant "refrain from driving any motor vehicle for one year
from date." More than four months later the Court issued its warrant for defendant's arrest for an alleged breach of the conditional
suspension. At the hearing the court modified and reinstated the
original sentence and then denied defendant's application to appeal
such sentence. Defendant, after an unsuccessful attempt to obtain reversal through certiorari in the Superior Court appealed
to the Supreme Court via writ of error.
The Supreme Court held the judgment of the municipal court
erroneous on the following grounds:
1 )The conditional suspension was unlawful because the
prohibition against driving was apparently worldwide
thus exceeding the court's territorial jurisdiction of the
City and County of Denver.
2) The conditional suspension was unlawful because the
one year conditional suspension exceeded the ninety day
jurisdiction of the municipal court.
3) Reinstating the sentence under an ordinance which was
enacted subsequent to the original sentence and suspension constituted unlawful retroactive procedure.
The Court held that the denial of defendant's right to appeal by
the municipal court was erroneous because the defendant had
the right to appeal either at the time of the original sentence or
at the time it was reinstated and the City could not by the ordinance in question limit appeals of municipal court cases.
In the case of French v. Haarhues-'plaintiffs in error, who were
plaintiffs in the trial court, appealed to the Supreme Court on
writ of error seeking reversal of a judgment of dismissal. The
'286 P. 2d 1107.
287 P. 2d 278.
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designation of the record included a "direction for entry of judgment" but no designation of the final judgment itself. The record
as transmitted to the Supreme Court included the order of dismissal
and the order for the entry of the judgment. The judgment itself
was not included in the record on error because the clerk either
failed to enter the judgment or failed to include it in the record
on error despite the fact that Rule 112 provides that the judgment
or part thereof to be reviewed shall be included in the record
whether designated or not. The Supreme Court dismissed the
writ of error because of the absence of a final judgment and in
doing so emphasized the responsibilities of an appealing party
saying, "The entry of a judgment upon the court's order is a
ministerial duty on the part of the clerk, but if a defeated litigant
desires a review by writ of error in this court, it is his duty to see
that the record presented here is properly prepared and completed
and contains a final judgment; otherwise dismissal will follow."
In Ferkovich v. Ferkovich' the wife brought an action for divorce and in connection therewith the Court granted her motion
for relief pendente lite, ordering her husband to make certain payments for the support of the wife and child. The wife's complaint
was dismissed and on appeal to the Supreme Court the dismissal
was affirmed. The wife subsequently moved the lower court for
a judgment in the amount of the aggregate of her husband's
delinquencies under the order pendente lite and also petitioned
for her costs and counsel fees in the Supreme Court. The lower
court denied the motion for judgment and ruled that it had no
jurisdiction to grant the petition for costs and fees in the Supreme
Court.
On appeal both rulings were reversed. The Supreme Court
held the trial court had jurisdiction to entertain the petition for
expenditures in connection with the Supreme Court review and
therefore had erred when it denied the petition on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction. It was held to be error for the trial court
to refuse to enter judgment for the past due support installments
since those installments constituted a debt against the husband
3274 P. 2d 602.
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and the trial court was without authority to enter an order which,
in effect, would be a cancellation of the payments in default.
It is interesting to note, in connection with the case of French
v. Haarhues, above, that the husband here contended that the writ
of error should be dismissed because the orders appealed from
were not final judgments. The court dispensed with this argument by saying, ".

.

. the orders were in every respect a finality

so far as plaintiff's rights were concerned."
Carrerav. Kelley' was the latest in a line of cases emphasizing
the limited jurisdiction of county courts in dependency matters.
The mother, faced with the necessity of working, had placed the
child in the care of petitioner. The petition in dependency alleged
that for a period of about one year prior to the time the petition
was filed the petitioner had provided the entire care and support
of the child. The trial court found that the child was dependent
and neglected and that the custody of the child was vested in
the court. An order was entered whereby the child was to spend
about nine months of the year with petitioner and three months
of the year with the mother. The order set out certain conditions
and payments the mother was to meet over a period of two years
after which period, if she fully complied with the terms of the
order, the custody was to be vested in her. The Supreme Court,
in a sharply worded opinion, ruled that the petition itself showed
that the child was not a dependent or neglected child under the
terms of the statute. It was held that there was no showing that
the child was neglected or imposed upon, because, on the contrary, the petition showed the child was being cared for by
petitioner. For this reason it was held that the trial court had no
jurisdiction over the child.
The case of Miller v. Singer3 was an action in which the complaint and evidence charged the defendants as joint tortfeasors.
The trial court instructed the jury that joint tortfeasors were
"jointly and separately liable" instead of the usual "jointly and
severally liable." The trial court then submitted two forms of
verdict by which the jury was permitted to and did in fact return
separate verdicts in different amounts against various defendants.
The Supreme Court held that the above instruction and the approval of the verdict in separate amounts constituted error, reciting
the general rule that, "Where an action is brought against joint
tortfeasors, if . . . the finding is against all of them, the verdict

must be a single verdict against all for a single sum and not a
several verdict against each defendant either for the same or
separate sums."
In the case of People v. Griffith' the defendant was arrested
and taken into custody without a warrant and an information
was filed against him in the County Court charging him with
'263 P. 2d 162.
279 P. 2d 846.
e276 P. 2d 559.
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driving while under the influence of liquor, speeding and leaving
the scene of an accident. The defendant moved for dismissal,
relying on Sec. 290, Ch. 16, '35 C.S.A. which directed that in
cases concerning the offenses with which he was charged "the
arrested person shall be immediately taken before a magistrate."
The defendant argued 1) that the County Court had no jurisdiction over the charges made against him because the above
quoted portion of Section 290 conferred exclusive jurisdiction
on justice of the peace courts, and 2) that County Court had no
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant since he was arrested without warrant and was not taken immediately before
a magistrate. The County Court dismissed the information and
the State appealed. The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal
holding that the language of Section 290 did not repeal the statute
conferring original jurisdiction upon county courts in misdemeanor cases, and that even if the arrest was illegal it did not
deprive the Court of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.
The case of National Motor Finance Co. v. DeMarcol involved
an attempted appeal from a judgment of a justice of the peace
court to the county court. Instead of filing an appeal bond substantially in the form prescribed by statute (C.R.S. 1953 79-13-13),
counsel for the appealing party filed his check and a petition
for supersedeas. The petition for supersedeas did not contain
certain information required in the statutory form of appeal bond,
7287 P. 2d 265.
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such as the name of the justice of the peace and the date of the
justice court judgment. The Supreme Court held that the County
Court never obtained jurisdiction, on two grounds:
1) A litigant cannot deposit money or a check as security
for the prosecution of an appeal, instead of entering
into an undertaking where the statute prescribes the
form of the bond.
2) The petition was lacking in essential allegations, and
the deficiency was not satisfied by any subsequent
happenings.
The case is also significant for the Court's statement that the
defendant's appeal bond in a justice court replevin action must
be in an amount at least equal to the established value of the propperty replevined and costs. The statutory form of appeal bond
prescribes a bond in double the amount of judgment and costs.
In the case of American Furniture Company of Denver v.
Veazie8 the buyer brought an action against the seller of a gas stove
to recover damages for injuries she sustained as a result of the
explosion of the stove. The complaint contained two causes of
action for the same injury; one upon the basis of implied warranty of fitness, and one based on negligence. The court submitted three forms of verdict to the jury; one for the plaintiff
on her first cause, one for the plaintiff on her second cause and
one for the defendant, with the instruction that the jury should
return but one verdict. The jury returned two verdicts for the
plainiff, one on each claim, which verdicts were accepted by the
court. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment on
the proposition that plaintiff was not entitled to recover on two
theories for one injury.
In its opinion the Court suggests that the trial court should
have submitted two forms of verdict for the first cause of action,
one for the plaintiff and one for the defendant, and two forms of
verdict for the second cause of action.
A somewhat related situation was presented in the case of
Hood v. The People.' In that case three counts of an information
were submitted to the jury. The court submitted three separate
forms of guilty verdict, one on each count, and but one form of
not guilty verdict. The defendant was found guilty on one count
and on appeal argued that the trial court erred in not submitting
separate forms of not guilty verdict as to each count. The Supreme Court held in this case that submitting three forms of not
guilty verdict would have been mere surplusage and that no error
was committed.
s281 P. 2d 803.
g 2 7 7 P. 2d 223.
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In the case of Rinn v. City of Boulder 0 the defendant was
found guilty in Police Court of violations of Boulder municipal
ordinances and the defendant appealed to the County Court. The
defendant filed various motions and a request for a jury trial.
The motions were denied and the defendant was allowed ten
days in which to file an answer. The defendant failed to answer
and the County Court dismissed the appeal. The Supreme Court
held that the dismissal was error.
The opinion holds that no answer is required in such a case
because the issues are framed by the perfection of the appeal
from the Police Court and the County Court merely tries de novo
the issues made in Police Court.
In the case of Dickerson v. Cary'" the plaintiff brought an action against the defendants to foreclose a defaulted deed of trust.
The defendants had previously commenced an action in another
court asking damages for fraud in connection with the same sale
contract in which the deed of trust was given. On defendant's
motion the court stayed the plaintiff's foreclosure proceedings
indefinitely or until disposition of the damage suit. On appeal
it was held that the stay was improperly granted since the defendants had acknowledged their liability when they elected to
sue for damages rather than recission of the contract. The opinion
also held that the stay was erroneous because the disposition of
one action would not determine all of the issues of the other and
the suits were therefore not identical.
In Trujillo v. District Court 2 the petitioner was charged with
the misdemeanor of involuntary manslaughter. Bail was set at
$2000.00 and petitioner was released on bond. Upon the return of
a guilty verdict the court, on its own motion, ordered the petitioner remanded to custody, discharged the bond and denied his
motion to remain on bond until the disposition of his motion for
a new trial.
The petitioner then brought an original proceeding in the
Supreme Court for a ruling upon the District Court to show
cause why he should not be released on bond. The order to show
cause was issued and in response thereto the District Court filed
an answer setting out that the admission to bond after verdict
was a discretionary matter and that it was the settled policy of
the court to refuse all bonds after conviction and before sentence
in such cases. The Supreme Court agreed that whether the bond
should be allowed to remain in effect after verdict was a discretionary matter, but held that following a rigid policy regardless
........
a
or circiunstances did not constitute an exercise of
discretion. Since the undisputed facts were that the petitioner
had lived in the state all his life, and not one scintilla of evidence
10280

P. 2d 1111.
U285 P. 2d 831.
282 P. 2d 703.
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adverse to his reputation and character had been brought out in
his trial, the District Court was ordered to reinstate the bond.
In the case of Maniatis v. Stiny" an action for accounting in
District Court was referred to a master and trial was held before
the master. The master made his report and objections thereto
were filed by the defendant. The nature of the objections were
such that the District Court could not properly pass upon them
without a reporter's transcript of the evidence introduced before
the master. However, no such transcript was supplied for the
judge's information in ruling on the objections. The judgment was
reversed on the ground that the trial court lacked authority to pass
upon the defendant's exceptions without examining the evidence
taken before the master.
The case of Smith v. Wagner14 was really an affirmance of the
lower court without an opinion except to correct an obvious
mathematical miscalculation in the judgment. In so doing the
Supreme Court reenunciated the familiar rule that the trial court,
having seen and heard the witnesses testify, is the best judge of
their credibility and therefore its findings upon conflicting testimony are presumed to be correct and may not be disturbed except
to correct manifest miscalculation.-D. B.

M274

P. 2d 975.
1279 P. 2d 1057.
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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF
APPEALS AND AGENCY
BY MAURICE REULER,

Of the Denver Bar

During the year last preceding there have been a great many
cases covering the subject of appellate procedure which have been
decided by our Supreme Court, but only two cases covering the
field of agency. Therefore, this article will be devoted primarily
to a consideration of the problems faced by the practitioner when
he gets ready to appeal a case to the Supreme Court of Colorado.
In general, the author will use the term "appeal" and "Writ of
Error" interchangeably unless otherwise noted.
Turning first to the matter of appellate procedure one is reminded of the admonition given by a law school professor to his
class in civil procedure. Namely, that clients do not, as a rule,
come to lawyers' offices in order to find out what they should do,
they come to lawyers' offices in order to find out how to do it.
The matter of procedure is clearly the "how" of the practice of
law. To paraphrase the old saying, "while procedure may not make
the case, it clearly helps it."
The writer has divided this subject into seven separate headings as a matter of convenience in classification. The first heading
which we will cover is that of Judgments.
Surely there is not a lawyer in the State of Colorado who does
not know that the primary object of a lawsuit is to secure a judgment, and that if the judgment is secured he may then perhaps,
execute on same. It would follow, therefore, that if judgment is
secured in the Trial Court, the next end to attain is to see that
that judgment is sustained in the Supreme Court. In order to
do this it necessary that a proper record on appeal be prepared.
Our Court, in the case of Ruth King and Joe King vs. Frank Williams,' ruled that the length of time within which a defeated litigant
may secure a Writ of Error in the Supreme Court is three months2 .
Here it appeared that on August 6th, 1954, verdict was had
for the defendant. On the 24th day of September the Trial Court
denied motions for a new trial and entry of judgment notwithstanding the verdict. At that time, the Trial Judge requested the winning
attorney to prepare a formal order of judgment. The formal order
was not filed in the District Court until the 11th day of October.
On the 8th od December counsel for the defeated litigant filed a
motion to extend the time within which to prepare the transcript.
The motion was granted and on the 11th of January a praecipe was
was issued. It should be noted that the praecipe was filed exactly
three months from the date of the entry of the final order of
judgment in the Trial Court.
Mr. Justice Clark sustaining a motion to dismiss, ruled "that
IC.B.A.
'Colo.

Ad. Sh. Vol. 7, No. 8, Pg. 271,
Rules C.P. 111(b).

1955.
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the sole question here is at what date did the judgment become
effective and final. A judgment is binding and effective from the
time of its pronouncement, although not actually entered into the
record until later." (Page 272) Mr. Justice Clark emphatically
states that it is the statement of the Court that judgment is entered
that constitutes the judgment and that it is from that day that
time will run.
The entry of judgment is ministerial and unless a Writ of
Error is taken out within 90 days from the date of pronouncement of judgment, Writ of Error will not lie. This case illustrates
the point that counsel cannot be too careful in computing the
time within which he must perfect a Writ of Error to the Supreme
Court.
In another interesting decision Byrdie W. Johnson vs. Harry A.
Johnson,3 the following occured: In what appeared to be a tort action, complaint was filed on March 22, 1949. Answer thereto was
filed November 30, 1951. On January 15, 1954 the defendant filed a
motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to prosecute, "pointing
out" that four terms of court have passed since the matter had
been at issue; that said matter has been at issue for more than
two years without any diligent prosecution by any of the plain-

IC.B.A.

Ad. Sh. Vol. 7, No. 13, 1955.
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tiffs or their attorneys (Page 491). The Court heard this motion,
and on the 22nd day of January, 1954, found, "that defendant's
motion is well taken," and ordered, "that it be and is hereby granted and the case is hereby dismissed." The Court then gave sixty
days in which to file a Bill of Exceptions and tender a trascript.
On the 5th day of March of the same year, the plaintiff filed
a motion for vacation of the judgment of dismissal, and on March
8th the Trial Court entered said motion by way of order granting same. On the 29th day of March the Trial Court reconsidered
the defendant's original motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute
and on that day it entered inter alia the following findings: "It
is hereby ordered, adjudged and decreed that the motion be
sustained and that the complaint of the plaintiff filed herein be
dismissed."
The plaintiff had had several different counsel, and on June
18th new counsel filed a motion for "Relief From Judgment" relying on provisions of Rule 60(b) (1) (2). On the 7th of September,
1954, the Trial Court again entered extensive findings followed by
a document entitled "Judgment." In said document the Court stated
"It is therefore ordered, adjudged and decreed by the Court that
the motion for relief from judgment filed by Byrdie W. Johnson
and heard September 7, 1954, be denied." Thereafter, counsel for
the plaintiff, on the 6th of December, approximately 89 days sub-
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sequent to the entry of the order of September 7th, filed praecipe
for Writ of Error.
Our Court, in ruling on the question under a motion to dismiss stated "the question presented on this issue is when was a
final judgment entered by the Trial Court

. .

. the final determina-

tion of the cause is a judgment whether the relief granted is legal
or equitable."4 "Any action by which a Trial Court terminates
the proceeding is a final judgment .

.

. now the Court considers

what was the action of this Trial Court that terminated the case.
Was it the document entitled "Judgment," or was it the entry and
pronouncement of its order of March 29th, dismissing the case
under the defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute.
The Court notes that the so-called judgment of September 7th
goes merely to the question as to whether plaintiff was entitled
to relief from the judgment theretofore entered." The Court states,
"it has been held that the character of an instrument, whether a
judgment or an order, is to determine by its contents and substance and not by its title" (Page 492).
The Court then notes that it is unfortunate that counsel was
misled by this document, but that under Rule 60(b), "that a motion under this subdivision does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation . . . such motion in any event is

directed to the discretion of the Trial Court, and when one files
such a motion he admits for all practical purposes that the judgment is in all respects regular on the face of the record, but asserts that the record would show differently except for mistake,
inadvertence or excusable neglect on behalf of counsel or client.
No such showing was here presented. If it be that probable error
appears in the record, then, of course, proper procedure indicates
a review upon writ of error procured within the prescribed period
of time following the entry of final judgment" (Page 493).
In the instant case a most difficult problem seems to be presented, for here we have a situation in which after judgment of
dismissal is entered counsel for the defeated litigant seeks review
of same by an appropriate motion under Rule 60(b). In the interim, the time in which counsel would have to take a writ of
4 49 C.J.S, Pg. 26.
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error under Rule 1ll(b), from the decision of the Trial Court
granting the motion to dismiss, is running, so that within 90 days
from the date of the granting of the motion, the right to appeal to
the Supreme Court by Writ of Error is gone. In the instant case, indeed, the right to appeal to the Supreme Court under the ruling
of the Court herein, had lapsed prior to the ruling of the Trial
Judge on the motion to set aside its previous judgment of dismissal. The Court, through Mr. Justice Clark points out that the
proper procedure is to file an independent action in the Trial
Court. In the interim, taking the case, to the Supreme Court.
This, of course, would appear to be proper procedure, but the
writer wishes to point out that where counsel finds himself in a
position in which he believes a motion under Rule 60 should
be filed, and particularly 60(b) thereof, that he should certainly
do one of two things: Request the Trial Court to determine the
matter speedily in order that the 90 day period within which to
docket in the Supreme Court will not elaose prior to the determination by the Trial Court under Rule 60(b), or (2) he should file
an independent action.
The writer would also note that there appears to be a hiatus
in the rules under this problem in this respect. Suppose that a
motion under Rule 60(b) to set aside a judgment is filed in apt
time; suppose also that counsel, heeding the instant case, dockets
within 90 days the case in -the Supreme Court; suppose that subsequent to the docketing of the case in the Supreme Court the
Trial Court determines that its previous judgment was in error,
and reverses same. The question then arises, what is counsel to
do? Has the Trial Court continued jurisdiction after the docketing of the case in the Supreme Court? And, if so, may the counsel
substiute th new judgment of the Trial Court for the judgment
of the Trial Court theretofore entered in the matter docketed in
the Supreme Court? To the writer, at least, the rules are not
clear, unless the phrase in 112(a) governs as to filing of a supplemental record.
Having considered the cases cited during the past year, within
which the question has arisen as to the date from which the time
for Writ of Error runs, we come now to the next important conLunch With
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sideration, and that is the state of the record itself. There have
been two decisions concerning a matter which appears to have
given lawyers difficulty and that is: What must be in the record
insofar as the question of a final judgment is concerned? Our
Court has held that the final judgment, as such. must he a Da-t
of the record. In the case of W. B. Sutley vs. Glenn C. Davis and
Roy S. Lofton,5 the following occurred: This was a condemnation
proceeding in which commissioners were appointed. The commissioners found that there was no necessity for the condrnrtinn,
and the counsel for the plaintiff moved to set aside the findings.
The Trial Court, on the 12th day of September, denied the motion and declared that a rehearing was dispensed with. Within
the proper time counsel for the plaintiff tendered and had the
record and the reporter's transcript of the evidence before the commissioners approved by the judge. Nothing further was in the record. Our Court citing Rule 112 (a) states: The record shall contain. "the material Dleadinos without unne-essary clirlicatinn Ohe
verdict, or the findings of fact and conslusions of law, together
with directions for the entry of judoment thereon. The master's
report, if any. The opinion, if any. The judgment or part thereof
to be reviewed and the designation or stipulation of the parties
as to the matters to be included in the record." The Court pointed
out that no judgment appeared in this case; that therefore. clismissal followed. The writer cannot uree too strongly upon his
brethren the need for careful study of the rules pertaining to appellate practice in order that the pitfall herein illustrated and
others like it may be avoided.
Again, in the decision of Edward L. French and Dorothy
Frenh vs. Art L. Haarhnes andi Rov N. Jones,6 the Court ninted
out that a designation for a direction for entry of judgment but
no designation for any final judgment as shown on the designation of record in error is a fatal defect and the Court again cites
Rule 112, stating that the judgment itself must appear as part of
the record; that to designate the entry of judgment is not sufficient, since that is merely a ministerial duty devolving upon the
5

C.B.A. Ad. Sh. Vol. 6, 1955.
C.B.A. Ad. Sh. Vol 7, No. 13, 1955.
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clerk of the Trial Court after the judgment itself has been entered.
The writer would suggest that in every case in which counsel
feels that there is the slightest chance that the matter will be
appealed to the Supreme Court, counsel should prepare findings
of fact, conclusions of law and a judgment. If such is done, the
question presented in the instant case and in the previous cases
cannot arise.
An interesting matter that has come up to our Court within
the past year has involved the proper parties to an appeal; that
is. who may take a writ of error to the Supreme Couirt? In the7
first of these cases, Mayme Schoenewald vs. Louis Shoen, et al,
we had the following situation: A complaint for damages in which
a third party complaint was filed. Third party defendants then
proceded by motion to dismiss and the Trial Court entered an order
dismissing without prejudice, the third party complaint. Third
party plaintiff thereupon proceeded by writ of error to the
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the order of a
trial court dismissing without prejudice a third party complaint
is not a final judgment from which writ of error can lie under
Rule 11. Again in Elwood Edwards, Inc., a Colorado corporation
and Elwood Edwards vs Hugo F. Sill,8 the court ruled that where
the real party in interest does not take a case to the Supreme
7 C.B.A. Ad. Sh. Vol. 7, No. 12, 1955.
SC.B.A. Ad. Sh. Vol. 7, No. 10, 1955.
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Court, nor is a party therein, appeal to the Supreme Court by Writ
of Error will not lie at the behest of a nominal party.
Although there has been but one decision in our Court within
the past year considering the general state of the record, still it
cannot be over emphasized that precision is needed in the perfecting of the Writ of Error and in the compilation of the record
upon which the Supreme Court will sit in judgment. Perhaps many
of us who know full well that the Trial Court having witnesses
before it, may many times reach judgments where we have committed errors in procedure and unfortunatelv let tbis hahit slin into
our practice in front of the Supreme Court. The thing which
counsel must keep in mind is that the Supreme Court passes judgment solely upon the record, occasionally supplemented by oral
argument, and that the record may appear vastly different from
the actual trial in the nisi prius court.
In the decision of Bernard E. Teets, et al, vs. Lee T. Richardson, individually, and doing business as Western Commission Company.9 The Court, through Mr. Justice Bradfield, in a short opinion
points out that the matter could be decided, "by dismissal of the
writ or error because of failure of compliance with the pertinent
rules of procedure, or upon the merits." The court points out, that
the record is defective in at least the following respects: "It contains only the pleadings filed by the parties, and the finding and
judgment of the Trial Court. There was no transcript and no exhibits attached thereto." The Court states, "that without a transcript of the evidence (in effect being unable therefore to construe
the exhibits as well) the presumption is that the judgment is supported by the evidence." This case well illustrates the fact that if
the record in complete detail is not before the Court the chance for
reversal is correspondingly lessened. One could almost say that it is
better to have a sloppy record, provided that it is complete, than
to have none at all, or one that is quite incomplete.
The next matter considered by our court, and one which has
formerly taken a considerable portion of its attention from time to
time, with respect to appellate procedure is that of original jurisdic9C.B.A. Ad. Sh. Vol.

7, No.

11, 1955.
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iton. There has been but one decision within the past year in this
field. Arthur J. Kemper vs. The District Court of the City and
County of Denver in the Second Judicial District, the Honorable
Joseph E. Cook, one of the Judges thereof, and Hazel I. Kemper,'0
In this decision, pursuant to Rule 116, the petitioner sought to
invoke the original jurisdiction of the Court in a divorce matter
in which an interloctuory decree had been entered by an unverified petition. The Court set aside the interloctuory decree and informed petitioner that he would have 15 days within which to
tender the record, or 15 days within which to answer. Petitioner
did neither, but rather went to the Supreme Court under Rule 116.
The Court points out, "the fact that a Court has erroniously granted
or denied a change of venue, or is otherwise proceeding without
or in excess of jurisdiction will not be regarded as sufficient to
invoxe Ruie 116," and states further, "that a Writ of Prohioicion is
not to be granted except in matters of great public importance."
The present one is not such a matter. The Court properly points
out that here petitioner could have proceeded in one of two fashions: Either by answer, or by tendering the record and proceeding
on Write of Error. He did neither and therefore suffered the result
above.
Within the past year there have been two cases considering
the question of the record in a criminal case before the Supreme
Court of this state. It should be noted at the outset that the Rules
of Civil Procedure do not appiy in criminal cases, and that it is
up to counsel representing a defendant in a criminal case to be
prepared pursuant to statute to represent his client in the proner
procedural fashion. In the first case the defendant was found guilty
of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor. He was so
found by a jury empaneled in the County Court. His counsel appealed to the Supreme Court under Writ of Error. The Supreme
Court noted that there was no bill of exceptions; that in the motion for new trial the only grounds stated were, "that the complaint was erroneous and prejudicial, the testimony of a witness
was incompetent and the sentence was contrary to law." The Court
notes that pursuant to Vol. 1, 53, C. R. S. Page 120, there must be:
"°C.B.A. Ad. Sh. Vol. 7, No. 9, 1955.
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(1) Assignments of Error; (2) the record must contain objections
to evidence or other matters of which the defendant complains; (3)
the record must disclose exceptions to all adverse rulings with
which defendant complains (Page 157).
Again in the case of Pete Joe Narango, also known as Pedro
Jose Narango vs The People of the State of Colorado," the
Court points out that when a criminal case is tried in the County
Court, appeal does not lie to the District Court, but only lies to the
Supreme Court by Writ of Error.
These then are the cases which have been decided by our
Supreme Court within the past year covering the question of
Appellate Procedure. The Rules of Civil Procedure state the rules
ot Lne game and it is up to us as attorneys, if we are to do the best
job for our clients, to abide by same.
There have been but two cases decided in the Court within the
past year covering the field of agency. In the first of these, Olson
Manufacturing Company, an Idaho Corporation, vs. Charles Corsentuno, et at,'- we have a rather involved fact situation, but a basic
principal of law to determine the controversy. Here the defendant
manufacturing company attempted to sell beet harvesters throughSC.B.A. Ad. Sh. Vol. 7, No. 1, 1954
uC.B.A. Ad. Sh. Vol.

7, No. 7, 1955.
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out the northern part of Colorado. In particular, their attemnts
led them to stage a parade through the City of Brighton. At the
parade was some official of the Platte Valley Motor Company,
who became interested in the disposition of these harvesters.
Thereafter an agreement was entered into between the Olson
Company and the Platte Valley Company. Olson brought the machines to the Platte Valley, some from its plant and from the
territory involved. They were reconditioned by Olson at Platte
Vailey, and Platte Valley was to pay Olson for the machines only
if and when sold. Olson dictated and controlled the sales price and
fixed the amount of commission to be paid or retained by Platte
Valley at the time of sale. Olson made the arrangements for sale
and the method of sale, agreed to recondition the machines, specifically set out the method of remittance, to wit, by Platte Vailey
and further, in case of unsold machines, it arranged for their storage and reserved a right to dispose of them elsewhere. Olson also
consigned a store of parts to Platte Valley. (Page 224).
It appears that Platte Valley sold several of the machines,
but none of them worked. As a result this suit was instituted, not
only against Olson, but against Platte Valley. The Court states that
the soie question here is, "that of agency" (Page 223). The Court
analyzes these facts and concludes, "that this was a matter of consignment; that Platte Valley was the agent of the Olson Company,
acting within the scope of its employment. That therefore, the Olson Company was liable, whereas the agent was not."
An interesting decision coming under this heading is Tracy
Moore vs Joseph A. Skiles.1' This case should be of interest to all
attorneys who try tort cases involving automobile collisions. The
facts appeared to be as follows: The plaintiff and her husband were
driving back from a party which they had attended at Dotsero,
Colorado. While on a narrow shelf road at a blind curve they either
struck or were struck by the defendant. The plaintiff passenger
thereupon sued the defendant. The defendant answered, setting up
the defense of contributory negligence, unavoidable accident and the
11C.B.A. Ad. Sh. Vol. 7, No. 1, Pg. 5, 1954.
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Family Car Doctrine. Trial was to a jury and the jury left each
party where they found them. The Court states: "The primary
question is when a husband and wife are journeying together in
a vehicle jointly owned by both and engaged in a mission with a
purpose common to both, can the negligence of the husband in
operating the vehicle be imputed to the wiie" (Page 6). The Trial
Court had submitted the following instruction, "in this case if the
jury finds and believes from a preponderance of the evidence that
each driver was guilty of negligence which contributed to the
proximate cause of the accident and that the accident would not
have occurred but for the combined negligence of both drivers,
then the plaintiff cannot recover for the damages which she claims
to have suffered, and the defendant cannot recover tor the damages which he claims to have suffered" (Pg. 6). In a well reasoned
opinion, our Court adopts the principal of imputed negligence,
which is in effect, set out in that instruction. The Court points
out that where two parties, husband and wife, are engaged in a
common venture, where the right of control may be exercised
by either, then the negligence of a driver should be attributed to
the passenger. The Court points out that had this car stood in the
name of either husband or wife, the Doctrine of the Family Car
would have prevailed and the wife of plaintiff could not have recovered; that it recognizes that authorities are divided on the
question of imputed negligence with respect to the non-driving
passenger, but that in its opinion a common sense view requires
that the owner or joint owner riding as an occupant in his own
car, using .the car for a purpose in common with the driver, is
presumed to have a right to control the driver and a right to
manage and direct the movements of the car. "Where joint ownership of the car is shown, where joint occupancy and possession
of the vehicle is admitted and where the occupant owners of the
car use it on joint missions the driver will be presumed to be
driving for himself and as agent for the other present joint owner"
(Page 9).
Further, in a situation such as the present there is a presumption of imputed negligence; that is of joint control and management.
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It should perhaps, therefore, be noted so far as counsel who
may be trying this type case are concerned, that hereafter the
question of imputed negligence might be raised by affirmative
defense; where counsel can find from discovery procedures that
the car appears to be jointly owned or that there appears in one
manner or another to be joint control of the car; that the parties
are on a common enterprise. If these things are shown the presumption will arise and the burden will be upon plaintiff, to overcome it.
In conclusion, it can be said that not only as to agency but also
as to the field of procedure, there has probably been very little
new law written within the past year. Rather, there has been a
return, particularly with respect to appellate procedure, to the
rules as written with a requirement that there be a more strict
adherence to same upon the part of trial counsel. It behooves us
all, therefore, to know all the rules as well as the substance of the
law prior to the representation of any client on a given case.-M. R.
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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF EVIDENCE DECISIONS
OF THE COLORADO SUPREME COURT
By

WILLIAM DOYLE

of the Denver Bar

Presented herewith is the annual review of evidence decisions.
It will be noted that there are numerous decisions in this field, and
due to this and the consequent length, comments have been eliminated. It is hoped that these brief abstracts will prove heipful.
IMMATERIAL AND PREJUDICIAL TESTIMONY

Huggins vs. Campbell'
Paternity action. Defendant's counsel cross-examined the
mother on her relations with other men prior to the date of conception, claiming that petitioner herself had opened the door in
direct examination.
The Court said the matter of petitioner's relationships with
other men was immaterial since the relationships were prior to
the period of gestation. It was further held that the witness could
not be discredited on matters immaterial to the issue on trial. To
continually question petitioner about such issues was held to constitute prejudicial error.
INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE

Hice vs. Pullum2
Plaintiff sued Defendant for water damage done to Plaintiff's
apartment, claiming Defendant's son was responsible. Water from
an upstairs bathroom was left running and damaged Plaintiff's
downstairs apartment. The only evidence indicating that the little
boy was guilty was that in the past he had been seen playing in the
bathroom. Other persons had access to the bathroom. The County
Court gave judgment for Plaintiff direct. In reversing this judgment, the Court said there was not a word of testimony connecting
the incident to the little boy or any member of Defendant's family.
De.iendant's motion for directed verdict should have been granted.
There was not a scintilla of evidence connecting the tort of the
child, if the child committed a tort, to the parent.
Alley vs. Troutdale Hotel'
The attorney for Defendant, in his opening statement, stated
that the evidence would show that Plaintiff was subject to epileptic
seizures which could have caused the injury which Plaintiff was
suing on. The only evidence introduced was a statement by Plaintiff's wife that a doctor had seven years before told Plaintiff he
had had such a seizure and testimony by a doctor who examined
Plaintiff after the accident that the injury could have been caused
by such a seizure, based to some extent on what Plaintiff's wife
had told the doctor concerning what the other doctor had told
1 C.B.A. Ad. Sh. Vol. I, Pg. 3, 1955.
3

C.8.A. Ad. Sh. Vol. II, Pg. 74, 1955.
C.B.A. Ad. Sh. Vol. VII, Pg. 211,

19.
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Plaintiff's wife seven years earlier, together with the doctor's observations plus the history given by the family at the time.
Court said the testimony on the epileptic seizure should have
been stricken because it was hearsay. A judgment based on a tinding of fact based on conjecture and possibility only, cannot be sustained, and the case is reversed.
4
Dawkins vs. Chavez
Action in wrongful death in which the issue was the sufficiency
of the evidence to establish the identity of the Defendant as the
driver of the lethal automobile. A witness at the scene identified
the car and a waitress at a near-by drive-in testified that Defendant
had ordered beer there 15 minutes before the impact. This witness
testified that she had idqntified Defendant in a police line-up as the
identical man. It was heI not to be error to receive this testimony.
The identification is an unsworn, out of Court act and the fact that
the witness is cross-examined at the trial does not detract from its
hearsay character. Nevertheless, it is received, and properly so, because it is trustworthy.

RES GESTAE

Boney vs. People'
Charged with murder, assault to rape, and forcible rape, Defendant pleaded not guilty. The victim died about 24 hours after
the attack due to allergic reaction to novocaine while an attempt
was made to repair some damage to her vagina and the murder
charge was disposed of on a directed verdict. The Court admitted
some statements made by the victim to a doctor who examined her
the day after the attack, and also admitted some statements made
by the victim to a deputy sheriff the following day concerning the
place the attack took place. The statements to the sheriff were the
only evidence introduced on venue.
The Court said that the testimony of the doctor and that of the
deputy sheriff was hearsay and was not a part of the res gestae.
It was not spontaneous nor was it voluntary since it was given in
reply to questions. Without this testimony, the State's case was insufficient. This was a mere narration of the events and hence was
inadmissable.
PARoLE EVIDENCE

Rocky Mountain Fuel vs. ProvidencePlaintiff sued Defendant for loss of a building and contents,
covered by fire insurance. The original policy set forth a list of
buildings and their contents, one of which was the "Casero Building," which was insured for $10,000.00 with contents. There were 14
other buildings. The building was destroyed by fire and Plaintiff
claimed a loss of $72,000.00. The increase was occasioned by moving
equipment from other buildings to the one destroyed. The policy
had been endorsed as follows: "The occupancy of all buildings
4 C.B.A. Ad. Sh. Vol. VII, Pg. 423, No. 12, 1955.
'C.B.A. Ad. Sh. Vol. III, Pg. 84, 1955.
C.B.A. Ad. Sh. Vol. III, Pg. 90, 1955.
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shown on the form is amended to read 'Machinery Warehouse' with
the exception of Item 8." The "Casero Building" was not Item 8.
Plaintiff offered to show that the equipment would be insured
wherever it was located. Defendant claimed this was a violation of
the parol evidence rule since the policy was clear, and the trial
court upheld Defendant's contention.
Court said the endorsement was ambiguous and parol evidence
could be used to explain the endorsement. If the original policy had
not been changed, there would be no need to attach the endorsement. Thus, the trial court erred in not admitting testimony on
what the endorsement meant.
McGuire vs. Luckenbach
Here the parties entered a contract providing that the Defendant
would operate certain mining properties and that profits and losses
would be shared equally. In an action by the Plaintiff to recover
one-half (%) of the profits, the jury decided that the Defendant
was not legally bound notwithstanding the contract since it appeared that Defendant had no actual interest in the operation-that his father-in-law was the real party in interest. In upholding
the refusal to exclude oral evidence as to the true relationship and
in holding that the parol evidence rule was not applicable, the
Court invoked the exception to the parol evidence rule which
allows a party to prove that the written contract was a sham and
that the true agreement was oral.
BEST EVIDENCE

Miles vs. People8
Defendant was charged and convicted of aggravated robbery
and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery. The bill of exceptions to the Supreme Court failed to contain two exhibits which
were confessions and which could not be found, and which appeared to be lost. The District Attorney produced carbon copies of
the confession, signed by Defendant and each page initialed by Defendant.
'C.B.A.

Ad. Sh. No. 17323.

C.B.A. Ad. Sh. Vol. V,

Pg. 163,

1955.
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Court said that when the originals are lost, carbon copies of
exhibits which are identical, can be used by the Supreme Court on
its review. If there is any question about the identical nature of the
exhibits, the question will be referred to a master.
RELEVANCY - CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

Bilorsky vs. Bilorsky9
Divorce action by husband against wife and separate maintenance by wife against husband. Wife offered to show that husband had written a compromising letter to some other woman, by
introducing the letter. Husband admitted writing the letter, but the
Court refused to admit the letter in evidence. Divorce granted husband.
On review, the Supreme Court determined that it was error
to exclude the letter because it showed that the husband was associating with other women, and also showed that the husband did
not leave home solely because of the wife--that he had another
motive.
ADMTSSIONS - EXCULPATORY STATEMENT

INDEPENDENTLY PREJUDICIAL

MacRae vs. People °
Defendant charged and convicted of aggravated robbery after
pleading not guilty. Defendant objected to testimony at the trial,
given by police officers who questioned him about large amounts
of money he had. His answer to the questions was that he had
saved it while in Canon City Penitentiary. Defendant did not take
the stand, but the statements made while talking to the police officers were admitted.
The Court said the statement was an admission against interest
made voluntarily and the entire statement could be admitted, including the reference to Defendant's past conviction.
STATEMENTS OF COUNSEL

Veto LaRocco and Lucy LaRocco vs. Joe Eliseo et all'
The action was one for alleged negligence in connection with
an automobile collision. The trial court had dismissed the action
at the end of Plaintiff's case where there was a failure by Plaintiff
to prove how the accident happened. A was passing B and while
9C.B.A. Ad. Sh. Vol. VIII, Pg. 254, 1955.
tC.B.A. Ad. Sh. Vol. IX, Pg. 280, 1955.
it C.B.A. Ad. Sh. Vol. IV, Pg. 130, 1955.
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doing so, side-swiped B and hit C head-on. The opening statements of counsel for A and B, while not admitting negligence, did
bring out that the collision occurred in this manner. The Supreme
Court per Holland, held that the admissions of counsel in the opening statements were binding on their respective clients and consequently, the trial judge erred in dismissing the complaint for lack
of evidence.
Res Ipsa Loquitur:
It was further concluded that the case was a proper one for
the application of the doctrine of res ispa loquitur. Comment: This
part of the decision is very interesting because in the normal res
ipsa situation there is a single Defendant and there is no question,
but that he had control of the instrumentality which caused the
injury, and the issue concerns how it happened. However, where
one of several Defendants perpetrated the wrong, it would seem
proper to require each to make his explanations and to not penalize
Plaintiff because he is unable to isolate the wrongdoer.
BLOOD ALCOHOL

2

McRae vs. People1

Holding that a blood alochol test was inconclusive where all of
the evidence indicated that the Defendant had consumed a small
quantity of 3.2% beer. Furthermore, the instruction that a person
is intoxicated where his capacity to drive is impaired in the slight12-C.B.A.

Ad. Sh. Vol. X, Pg. 354, 1955.
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est degree, was disapproved in a case such as that at bar pertaining
to 3.2% beer. 4-3 Decision.
The above opinion was published May 9, 1955; however, it was
superseded by a new opinion published July 25, 1955, in which the
Court reached a contrary conclusion holding that the evidence was
sufficient and that the instructions were proper.
SURVIVOR STATUTE

Ofstad vs. Sarconi5
Where the testimony of the proponent of a will and that of the
attorney who drafted the will is in conflict as a result of the attorney testifying that the proponent had told him what to put in the
will and a denial of this fact by the proponent, it was error for the
Court to exclude the testimony of the proponent-the dead man
statute being no bar to the admission of such testimony since an
exception to that statute is present when an adverse party calls
the witness and thus waives the bar.
WITNESSES-CRoss EXAMINATION

1

Ripple vs. Brack "
In a civil damage action it was error to allow counsel for Plaintiff to cross-examine the patrol officer concerning the plea entered
by the Defendant in a criminal case tried before a justice of the
peace. Such questions are immaterial in a civil action and are, of
course, highly prejudicial.-W. D.
1C.B.A. Ad. Sh. Vol. VII, Pg. 375, No. 11, 1955.
11C.B.A. Ad. Sh. Vol. VII, Pg. 466, No. 12, 1955.
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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF COLORADO CASES
ON NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
By ARNOLD M. CHUTKOW of the Denver Bar
During the past year, the Supreme Court decided four cases
dealing directly or indirectly with the Law of Negotiable Instruments. Two of these decisions, American National Bank of Denver
v. First National Bank of Denver, et al.,' and Harsin Motor Co. v.
Colorado Savings & Trust Co., et al.,2 dealt directly with problems
peculiar to the field of negotiable instruments.
In the American National Bank case, the plaintiff brought the
action against the Hereford State Bank, the first endorsee on a
check and against the First National Bank of Denver, an intermediate endorsee. The check in question was payable to two
payees, but was negotiated to the defendant, Hereford bearing the
endorsement of only one. Hereford endorsed to a bank in Cheyenne, Wyoming which in turn endorsed to the defendant, the First
National Bank of Denver, which presented check to the draweeplaintiff. The drawer objected to the payment because of the
missing endorsement and the plaintiff reimbursed the drawer's
account and instituted the action to recover the amount paid on
the check.
The action was based upon two theories, one stemming from
the Negotriable Instruments Law and the other stemming from the
doctrine of payment under mutual mistake of fact, i.e. that all
endorsements necessary were not properly on the instrument. The
Supreme Court affirmed a dismissal as to the First National Bank,
but reversed with respect to a dismissal on the second theory as
to the Hereford State Bank.
Reasoning that since the instrument was not properly endorsed
by both payees, the Court concluded that the Negotiable Instruments Law was not applicable since the instrument was not negotiable because of the missing endorsement. Apparently basing its
decision on quaisi-contractual notions, the Court reversed the dismissal as to Hereford, stating:
"The present action must be based upon an obligation
on Hereford's part to reimburse plaintiff for monies in its
possession to which it is not legally entitled."
No explanation was offered for affirming the dismissal as to
the First National Bank of Denver. Perhaps it may be assumed
that the affirmance of this dismissal was based on the desire to
avoid circuity of actions. Nevertheless, the case does stand for the
proposition that the first endorsee in the chain of titles who
takes an instrument where the endorsement of one of a number
of payees is missing, will be held liable in an action by the drawee
to recover payments made on the instrument.
In the case of Harsin Motor Co. v. Colorado Savings & Trust
Co., et al., the drawer issued a check payable to "Barne's Used Cars"
in payment of a car which was purchased. The findings of the trial
I

2

Colo.
Cold.

,

277 P. 2d 235.
284 P. 2d 235.
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court were to the effect that one Rickerson, offered to sell Harsin
a 1951 Chevrolet automobile, advising Harsin that the title to the
car was in the name of "Barnes Used Cars"; that the certificate
of title was in the possession of one Zipprodt. Harsin, before completing the purchase, telephoned the manager of Zipprodt, a finance
company, who was a third party defendant, and verified that
Zipprodt held the certificate of title to the 1951 automobile. Harsin,
desiring to make payment to the owner of the car, executed his
check payable to Barnes Used Cars, though Rickerson had asked
Harsin to make him the payee, which Harsin declined to do. It
appeared at the time that Rickerson owed the finance company
the sum of $500.00 and that Zipprodt, the finance company, was
holding a certificate of title to the automobile. Zipprodt did not
have a chattel mortgage on the car. Rickerson then took the check
ot the finance company and endorsed it in the presence of the
finance company as follows:
Barnes Used Cars-Charles Barnes-James H. Rickerson.
It was later ascertained that the automobile had been stolen
and it was repossessed by the rightful owner, whereupon the plaintill informed the bank that the endorsement on the check was a
forgery and demanded that the bank credit his account. The bank
did this but later withdrew the credit it had given.
The named payee was actually an existing person, doing business in Ordway, Colorado. Rickerson had assumed the name, although the payee had nothing to do with the transaction, apparently for the purpose of avoiding a violation of the statute requiring a person dealing with used cars to have a license.
The trial court dismissed the action against all defendants.
It should be noted that the action was basically a contest between
the drawer and the drawee of the check. The question was one of
whether or not a forgery had been committed when the payee's
name was endorsed by Rickerson. Resolution of the question of
whether or not a forgery had been committed depended on the
intent of the drawer in making the check payable to "Barnes Used
Cars".
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The Court drew a distinction between the situation where a
check is drawn payable directly to the imposter acting under an
assumed name and the situation where the check, as in the present
case, is drawn and delivered to the imposter, unpon the representation that the latter is the agent of the payee, even though the
payee is fictitious or non-existent. In the former case, it is generally held that the drawer's intent is to make the check payable
to the person physically present before him, regardless of the name
assumed or employed by the person. On the other hand, if the intent
was not to make the check payable to the person physically present
before the drawer, but to his principal, whether there was such a
principal or not, an endorsement by the importer, may constitute a
forgery. If it is a forgery, of course, the drawee may not charge the
account of the drawer.
The Court accordingly reversed and remanded with instructions to vacate the order of dismissal, and to proceed with a trial
on the merits. It was the opinion of the Court, that inasmuch as a
forgery may have been committeed, the facts should be presented
before any determination of the issue was made.
3
In the case of Wysowatcky, Guardian v. Denver-Willys, Inc.
the problem was that of where an indorsee takes a negotiable instrument from a fiduciary who cashes the check in payment of a
personal debt or for his personal benefit. It was contended by the
plaintiff-in-error that if the endorser knows that the endorser is a
fiduciary, the former is put upon notice of the breach of trust of
the endorser and must make inquiries so as to determine the correct facts.
The Court, however, applied the language of the Uniform
Fiduciaries Act 4 and held that inasmuch as there was no evidence
that the negotiation of the check amounted to a breach of a fiduciary obligation, and more important, no evidence that the indorsee
had actual knowledge of the breach of the obligation, the indorsee
was not liable to the principal of the fiduciary.
In the case of Hubby v. Willis Agency, Inc,,' it was held that
a payee and holder of a Promisory Note may maintain an action
thereon, even though he is not the beneficial owner of the instrument upon which suit is brought. Thus, even though the payee only
has naked legal title and is nominally the payee, the beneficial or
equitable ownership being vested in another, or if payee and holder
does not have the entire interest in the instrument, he may nevertheless maintain an action on it in his own name, regardless of any
notions of real party in interest.
The cases decided by the Court on negotiable instruments are
not many but it is believed that the first two, the American National
Bank case and the Harsin case are interesting and involve directly
problems peculiar to the field of negotiable instruments.-A. C.
Colo. 281 P. 2d 165.
1953, Chapter 57, Article 1, Section 4.
__ C61o.
, 283 P. 2d 1080.

4C.S.A.
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ONE YEAR REVIEW COLORADO WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION LAW
By WILLIAM H. HAZLITT of the Denver Bar
Only one decision involving workmen's compensation was
handed down during the last year. That case reduces but does not
eliminate uncertainty from compensation claims arising out of
heart attacks, despite the Court's assertion that the law is settled.
The case was Industrial Commission et al. v. InternationalMinerals
and Chemical Corporation et al.'
Gallegos was employed by International Minerals for one day.
His job was to assist another employee in filling sacks with mica.
The procedure was to place an empty sack on a scale and pull a
lever which would release mica in a chute to fill the sack. No heavy
work was involved. When he had weighed a few sacks, his coworker's nephew came in and asked Gallegos to fix his car. Gallegos fixed the car and then helped push it some little distance to
start it. When he returned to work, he found that his co-worker
had loaded a hand truck with four sacks. Gallegos pushed the
truck about thirty feet on a cement floor, dumped it, started back
with the empty truck, collapsed and died of a coronary occlusion.
He did not slip or have an accident of any kind. At the hearing
before the Referee, the pathologist's autopsy report showing that
death was a result of acute congestive heart failure and that excessive physical exertion probably induced the heart failure was
placed in evidence. Gallegos' co-worker, the only eye-witness, testified that Gallegos did not have an unusual exertion on the job.
There was evidence that Gallegos had a longstanding heart condition.
The Referee denied the claim because there was no history of
accidental strain. This finding was vacated by the Commission
which awarded compensation. The District Court set the award
aside and the Supreme Court affirmed, saying it has consistently
held that, in such cases, claimant must prove more than mere exertion but must establish over-exertion.
Going further, the Court commented that the evidence was
undisputed that Gallegos over-exercised himself in pushing the
automobile which he had repaired, an act outside the scope or
course of employment. This is unfortunate and has the effect of
IC.B.A.

Ad. Sh. Vol. 7, P. 498. Case

No. 17712.
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rendering uncertain an otherwise clearcut statement of the law.
Despite the statement that over-exertion is essential to a claim for
compensation for congestive heart failure, one wonders what the
conclusion would have been had Gallegos remained on the job and,
doing ordinary work, suffered the attack. If there had been no
evidence of any exertion other than that involved in the ordinary
work, might not the Court possibly have applied the rule that it
applied in a previous heart case (USF&G v. I. C.2) "That an accident is a result, the causes of which are unexpected and unusual
or that it may be also an unexpected and unusual result from ordinary causes." We are still not sure that over-exertion is a sine
qua non.
There have been statutory changes increasing the award for
burial expenses to $350.00, the maximum death benefit to $9,859.50,
the temporary total disability benefit to $31.50 per week, the maximum facial disfigurement award to $1,000.00, the death payment
to the "subsequent injury fund" (where there were no dependents
of the deceased) to $1,250.00, the permanent partial disability
maximum to $8,190.00, the lump sum maximum to $9,859.50, and
adopting a new mortality table. Also of considerable interest is
the new Medical, Surgical and Hospital Fee Schedule which became effective August 1, 1955 and which reflects the general rise in
the cost of living.-W. H.
96 Colo. 571.
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THE RIGHT TO REPRESENTATION BY COUNSEL
UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
HAROLD E. HURST
Professor, Univ. of Denver College of Law
The right of an accused in state criminal proceedings to be represented by counsel has frequently been claimed as a necessary
element of the fair hearing inherent in due process of law required
of the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.
The right to be represented by counsel in federal criminal proceedings is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment but no specific
mention of the right to counsel in state proceedings is to be found
in the Constitution. The Court has consistently refused to rule
that the procedural protections of the Bill of Rights are a catalogue of rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against
state encroachment., And so, as might be expected, the Court has
adamantly refused to hold that representation by counsel in criminal proceedings is a fixed and specific requirement of due process.
Rather, due process or the lack of it depends upon whether in the
judgment of the Court the proceeding is characterized by fairness
-- or the lack of it. The principle has found expression in the following language:
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the conviction
and incarceration of one whose trial is offensive to the
common and fundamental ideas of fairness and right, and
while want of counsel in a particular case may result in
a conviction lacking in such fundamental fairness, we cannot say that the Amendment embodies an inexorable command that no trial for any offense, or in any court, can be
fairly conducted and justice
2 accorded a defendant who is
not represented by counsel..
And to bolster its judgment in the matter, the Court has tabulated provisions of state constitutions and statutes, concluding that
a majority of the states appeared not to consider representation by
counsel fundamental to a fair trial in all situations.
What, then, is a fair trial in which the defendant is not represented by counsel? The following sections indicate the conditions
and circumstances which may run so contrary to the Court's collective sense of fair play as to result in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
ILLITERACY, YOUTH, IGNORANCE, INTELLIGENCE OF THE DEFENDENDANT

There is a clear relationship in the Court's mind between a defendant's capacity to prepare and present a defense and the fairness of a criminal proceeding against the defendant without coun'Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 29 S. Ct. 14, 53 L. Ed. 97 (1908); Adamson v. California,
332 U.S. 46 67 S. Ct. 1672, 91 L. Ed. 1903 (1947); Wolf v. Colorado 338 U.S. 25, 69 S. Ct. 1359,
93 L. Ed. 1782 (1949); Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 74 5. Ct. 381, 98 L. Ed. 324 (1954).
i Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 62 S. Ct. 1252, 86 L. Ed. 1595 (1942).
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sel. The Court has frequently drawn the inference s that defendants
who were young, ignorant, illiterate and inexperienced were not
capable of making a defense, and has declared that to put such individuals on trial without counsel is fundamentally unfair and consequently is not due process.
Paradoxical though it be, the burden of establishing the incapacity or inability of a defendant to obtain a fair hearing without
counsel falls upon the defendant himself. Obviously, cases involving the question usually come into a lawyer's hands only after
trial and conviction of the defendant. The lawyer's decision
whether to raise the issue of unfairness because of lack of counsel
requires a careful study of the pretrial and trial proceedings and
an investigation of the personal characteristics of the defendant,
because the factors which indicate lack of capacity to defendyouth, illiteracy, inexperience, mental deficiency-are matters of
degree and exist in different combinations.
Trial of one incapable of defending himself adequately without counsel may not be considered "offensive to the common and
fundamental ideas of fairness and right" if counsel is provided in
time to raise the question of the fairness of the proceeding, or if
the court adequately safeguards the defendant from prejudicial
error.4
3In the following cases convictions have ben reversed or remanded to determine the truth of

the allegations of persons seeking release on the grounds that trial without counsel was unfair:
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S. Ct. 55, 77 L. Ed. 158, 84 A.L.R. 527 (1932); House v. Mayo,
324 U.S. 42, 65 S. Ct. 989, 89 L. Ed. 1367 (1945); Wad v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672, 68 S. Ct. 1270,
92 L. Ed. 1647 (1948); DeMeerleer v. Michigan, 329 U.S. 633, 67 S. Ct. 596, 91 L. Ed. 584 (1947);
Uveges v. Pennsvlvani,. 335 U.S. 437. 69 S. Ct. 184, 93 L. Ed. 127 (1948); Palmer v. Ashe, 342
U.S. 142, 72 S. Ct. 191, 96 L. Ed. 154 (1951); Reece v. Georgia, _ U.S. _ , 76 S. Ct. 167. -- L.
Ed.
(1955); M-ssev v. Moore 348 U.S. 105 75 S. Ct. 145, 99 L. Ed. 134 (1954); Chandler v.
Fretag, 348 U.S. 3, 75 S. Ct. 1, 99 L. Ed. 4 (1954).
'h- Co.rt h-s refused to reverse convictions in: Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 62 S. Ct. 1252,
86 L. Ed. 1595 (1942) Gayes v. New York, 332 U.S. 145, 67 S. Ct. 1711, 91 L. Ed. 1962 (1947);
Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 68 S. Ct. 763, 92 L. Ed. 986 (1948); Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728,
68 S. Ct. 1256, 92 L. Ed. 1683 (1948); Quicksall v. Michigan 339 U.S. 660, 70 S. Ct. 910, 94 L. Ed.
1188 (1950); Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55, 72 S.Ct. 141, 96 L.Ed. 86 (1951).
4 Counsel appointed in time to object to prejudicial errors: Canizio v. New York, 327 U.S. 82,
66 S. Ct. 452, 90 L. Ed. 545 (1946); Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55, 72 S. Ct. 141, 96 L. Ed.
99 (1951); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 60 S. Ct. 321, 84 L. Ed. 377 (1940). Cf. Reese v.
Georgia,
U.S. .. . 76 S. Ct. 167,
L. Ed.
(1955).
Rights of the defendant adequately protected by the trial judge: Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S.
173, 67 S. Ct. 216, 91 L. Ed 172 (1946); Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134, 67 S. Ct. 1716, 91 L. Ed.
1955 (1947); Quicksoll v. Michigan, 339 U.S. 660, 70 S. Ct. 910, 94 L. Ed. 1188 (1950).
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COMPLEXITIES OF CHARGE-TECHNICALITIES OF DEFENSE

Although an accused appears in all respects to be of normal
intelligence and experience, conviction without the assistance of
counsel (unless intelligently waived) may be a deprivation of liberty without due process of law where close technical distinctions
between the degrees of crime and available defenses present complex problems in the presentation of evidence and instructions to
the jury. The Supreme Court has reversed convictions where the
offense charge was distinguishable from other lesser crimes only
by technical differences in the evidence required to convict, different instructions to the jury, and availability of different defenses,
the Court saying that such complexities "are a closed book to the
average layman."5 The Court considers such trials unfair.,
Although no such cases have come before the Supreme Court,
it is reasonable to expect that the Court would hold representation by counsel to be necessary to a fair hearing before an administrative tribunal or a court in a civil matter where the issues are
complex and the proof difficult. For instance, matters such as
the public convenience and necessity or the compensability of an
industrial injury and the extent of the disability are a "closed
book to the average layman." The applicant for a truck licensing
permit or the injured workman seeking workman's compensation, appearing without a lawyer or other expert representative
because he is unaware of the pitfalls ahead, would seem to be
placing his rights in danger unfairly unless the tribunal concerned
itself affirmatively in the protection of such rights in the absence
of counsel.
OPPORTUNITY

OF

COUNSFL

TO

PREPARE-EFFECTIVE

COUNSEL

The fair hearing required by due process of law includes an
opportunity to prepare and present such defenses as may be available. It would seem to follow that appointment of counsel at such
a time as to make it impossible for him to prepare for trial likewise
deprives those defendants of liberty without due process who need
counsel because of incapacity. This view of requirement of due
been applied by the Court in the few cases
process seems to have
7
presenting the issue.

It would seem also, although there are no state cases reversing
convictions on that ground, that trial of a defendant who needs
counsel but who is represented by counsel so obviously negligent
or incompetent as to be of no assistance is inconsistent with the
constitutional guarantee of a fair trial. If appointment of counsel
at such time as to render his assistance valueless does not satisfy
5 Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471, 65 S. Ct 363, 89 L. Ed. 398 (1945).
eTomkins v. Missouri, 323 U.S. 485, 65 S. Ct. 370, 89 L. Ed. 407 (1945); Rice v. Olson 324
U.S. 786, 65 S. Ct 989, 89 L. Ed. 1367 (1945); Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271, 66 S. Ct. 116, 90
Cf.
L. Ed. 61 (1945); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 68 5. Ct. 1252, 92 L. Ed. 1690 (1948).
Betts v. Brady, 316 U 5. 455, 62 5. Ct. 1252, 86 L. Ed. 1595 (1942); Gryger v. Burke ,334 U.S.
728,, 68 5. Ct. 1256, 92 L. Ed. 1683 (1948).
, Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S. Ct. 55, 77 L. Ed. 158, 84 A.L R. 527 (1932); Hawk v.
Olson, 326 U.S. 271, 66 5. Ct. 116, 90 L. Ed 61 (1945); White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760, 65 5. St.
U.S. -, 76 5. Ct. 167. .-- L. Ed ._ (1955).
978, 89 L. Ed. 1348 (1945); Reece v. Georgia, .
Cf. Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 60 S. Ct 321, 84 L. Ed. 377 (1940); Canizio v. New York,
327 U.S. 82, 66 S. Ct. 452, 90 L. Ed. 545 (1946); Stroble v. California, 343 U.S 181, 72 S. Ct.
, 76 5 Ct. 167, ___L. Ed . -- (1955).
599, vo L. Ed. 872 (1952); Michel v. Louisiana, _ U.S..

42
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due process, then neither does the appointment of counsel of such
kind as to render his assistance valueless."
CONDUCT OF THE POLICE OR PROSECUTOR

Aside from coercing confessions from defendants, police or
prosecutors frequently obtain convictions or pleas of guilty by
deception practiced upon a defendant who is without counsel.
Some trials are unfair because a defendant who needs counsel
is not provided with counsel." It goes without saying that such a
trial is even more repugnant to the requirements of due process
if the defendant is also the victim of deception or misrepresentation. Such is clearly the view of the Supreme Court.'" Similarly,
although the degree of unfairness is lesser, it appears to be a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment for the police or prosecutor to
practice deception and misrepresentation on a defendant who
might otherwise have been considered capable of presenting his
defense without counsel."
The logic of due process, which is the rule of fairness when
procedure is being considered, also appears in those cases which
the Court has refused to reverse. There would seem to be no particular unfairness in a conviction resulting from a proceeding in
which deception, misrepresentation or "deals," promising the dropping of other charges or a lighter sentence in return for a plea of
guilty, are perpetrated upon a defendant without counsel, if the
defendant is afforded counsel in time to raise objections 2to the
procedure and otherwise to protect the defendant's rights.'
S This issue might well have been raised in Powell v. Alabama, Hawk v. Olson, and White
v. Rogen (see note 7 above), in which the Court declared a failure of a fair trial where defendants were denied "effective aid and assistance" of counsel. From the circumstances as reported,
however, it appears that the Court may have been indulgent toward counsel since the lack of
effective aid and assistance" seemed at least in part the result of inefficient or inattentive
counsel, rather than of lack of time to prepare. The issue was specifically raised and decided
against the defendant in Poret et al. v. Louisiana, ._ U.S ...., 76 S. Ct. 158, .--. L. Ed'. . (1955).
$Supra.
1" Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437, 69 S. Ct. 184, 93 L. Ed. 127 (1948); Palmer v. Ashe,
342 U S. 142, 72 S. Ct. 191, 96 L. Ed. 154 (1951).
"Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 61 5. Ct. 572, 85 L. Ed. 859 (1941), wherein the defendant,
told he was charged with burglary but prevented from seeing the indictments, and told he
would receive a sentence of not over three years if he would plead guilty, found later that he
would plead guilty, found later that he had actually pleaded guilty to a more serious charge
with a mandatory minimum sentence of 20 years.
" Canizio v. New York, 327 U.S. 82, 66 S. Ct 452, 90 L. Ed. 545 (1946); Gallegos v.
Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55, 72 S. Ct. 141, 96 L. Ed. 86 (1951); Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181,
72 S. Ct 599, 96 L. Ed. 872 (1952).
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CONDUCT OF TRIAL

The trial judge is the key figure in any proceeding wherein
a person's life, liberty or property is affected. The fairness of the
proceeding is primarily the responsibility of the judge. Even when
trial of a defendant without counsel would not necessarily be a
violation of the constitutional right to due process, the deportment
of the trial judge or the manner of conducting the trial may neverthe less be so prejudicial as to render the trial unfair. Substantial
prejudice may arise in many ways-the admission of incompetent
or prejudicial evidence, exclusion of material evidence favorable
to the defendant, improper remarks by the judge or prosecutor in
the presence of the jury, intimidation of the defendant to plead
guilty, misrepresentation in explaining the charge to the defendant. The bounds of ordinary decency would seem to have been
exceeded in any trial without counsel in which such practices
were permitted, and so seems the Court to look upon the matter."
Where a defendant is not incapable of providing an adequate
defense and the trial court properly advises the defendant, failure to offer appointed counsel is not a denial of the right to a fair
trial. Three cases are noted" in which the trial judge explained
to the defendants the consequences of a plea of guilty, the right
to counsel, the right to a jury trial and the degree of proof which
would be required to convict, but in which the defendants nevertheless elected to plead guilty. All three cases were affirmed
when the defendants sought release on the ground of lack of counsel and denial of a fair hearing. Here, it would seem, the judge has
done all that counsel could do to safeguard the rights of the defendant, and the defendant, having been made aware of his rights
and the difficulties ahead, has intelligently waived his right to
counsel. It is clear that a defendant who is capable of understanding the nature and significance of the proceeding can waive his
right to be represented by counsel.'
SERIOUSNESS OF THE OFFENSE

The seriousness of the offense with which the defendant is
charged-whether the penalty be capital punishment or imprisonment-is of little consequence in determining if counsel must be
appointed. Although there appear in the cases statements that indicate a disposition on the part of the Court to require the appointment of counsel in capital cases, the actual reason for the decisions
appears to be the requirement that in any case-capital or otherwise-the proceeding be fair in the sense that a defendant who is
without counsel be intelligent and experienced enough to defend
himself adequately or to waive counsel intelligently, taking into
's House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42, 65 S. Ct. 517, 89 L. Ed. 739 (1945); Townsend v. Burke, 334
U.S. 736, 68 S. Ct. 1252, 92 L. Ed 1690 (1948); Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773, 69 S. Ct. 1247, 93
L. Ed. 1686 (1949); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. U.S. 257, 68 S. Ct. 499, 92 L. Ed 682 (1948).
.' Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173, 67 S. Ct. 216, 91 L Ed. 172 1946); Foster v. Illinois, 332
U.S. 134, 67 S. Ct. 1716, 91 L. Ed. 1955 (1947); Quicksall v. Michigan, 339 U.S. 660, 70 S Ct.
910, 94 L. Ed. 1188 (1950).
15Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S 728, 68 S. Ct. 1256, 92 L. Ed. 1683 (1948) and cases cited in
footnote 14 above. See also Poret et al. v. Louisiana .... U.S. -, 76 S. Ct. 158, ___ L. Ed. _
(1955), in which the defendant, in his flight to avoid apprehension, was deemed to have waived
his right to counsel for the purpose of attacking the validity of the indictment, time for which
attack expired while defendant was a fugitive in another state.
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consideration the complexity of the issues and the conduct of the
6
investigation and trial. In Powell v. Alabama,1
a capital case, the
Court said, "All that it is necessary now to decide, as we do decide,
is that in a capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ
counsel, and is incapable adequately of making his own defense
because of ignorance, feeble mindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it
is the duty of the court, whether requested or not, to assign counsel for him as a necessary requisite of due process of law

. . ."

Four

other cases have reached the Supreme Court in which defendants
were on trial for capital offenses and did not have counsel. In
three of them 17 the Court reversed state court dismissals of petitions for habeas corpus on the authority of Powell v. Alabama,
interpreting the Alabama case to mean that "at least in capital
offenses" where the defendant is incapable of making an adequate
defense there must be representation by counsel. The emphasis
in each case is upon the incapacity of the defendant rather than
upon the seriousness of the offense. In the fourth case, 8 the rights
of the defendant to have a lawyer, the degree of proof necessary
to convict, the right to trial by jury, and the consequences of a
plea of guilty were explained by the trial judge to the defendant
who nevertheless elected to plead guilt. In this capital case, where
the trial judge took great pains, short of actual appointment of
counsel, to avoid any unfairness or prejudice, the conviction was
affirmed.
No case has as yet reached the Court on the right to counsel
issue wherein a defendant, on trial for a capital offense, and not
shown to be incapable of representing himself, elected to stand
trial without the aid of counsel and was convicted. Since the basic
consideration in right to counsel cases is the fairness of the proceeding, taking into account all the circumstances, it seems unlikely that the Supreme Court would require the appointment of
counsel in such a case solely because the offense charged threatened capital punishment. The Court has refused to reverse con'e287 U.S. 45, 53 S Ct. 55, 77 L. Ed. 158, 84 A.L.R. 527 (1932).
"7Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471, 65 S. Ct. 363, 89 L. Ed. 398 (1945); Tomkins v. Missouri,
323 U.S. 485, 65 S. Ct. 370, 89 L Ed. 407 (1945); Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271, 66 S. Ct. 116,
90 L. Ed. 61 (1945).
ICarter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173, 67 S. Ct. 216, 91 L. Ed. 172 (1946)
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victions in noncapital cases wherein the defendant intelligently
elected to stand trial and make his own defense.
Furthermore, the consideration of fairness of the proceeding
runs through noncapital state felony cases as the basis for decision, rather than the seriousness of the offense. Typical lauguage
appears in Palmer v. Ashe.1" "This Court has repeatedly held that
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires
states to afford defendants assistance of counsel in noncapital
criminal cases when there are special circumstances showing that
without a lawyer a defendant could not have an adequate and fair
defense."
Convictions without counsel have been reversed or remanded
wherein the charge was burglary, 20 robbery,2

1

larceny, 22 and con-

fidence game.2 In no case has the Court placed its refusal to consider a proceeding violative of the Fourteenth Amendment on the
ground that the offense charged was not serious or that such offense was a misdemeanor as distinguished from a felony. It could
with reasonable safety be ventured that any conviction, regardless
of the nature of the charge or the seriousness of the punishment,
will be reversed where it can be shown "that without a lawyer a
defendant could not have an adequate and fair defense."2 4-H. H.
19342 U.S. 142, 72 S. Ct. 191, 96 L. Ed. 154 (1951); see also Bute v. Illinois, 333 US. 640,
1-8 S. Ct. 763, 92 L. Ed. 986 (1948); Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55, 72 S Ct. 141, 96 L. Ed.
99 (1951); Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105, 75 S. Ct. 145, 99 L. Ed. 135 (1954)
Smith v. O'Grody, 312 U.S. 329, 61 S. Ct. 572, 85 L. Ed. 859 (1941); House v Mayo, 324
U.S. 42, 65 S. Ct. 517, 89 L. Ed. 739 (1945); Rive v. Olson, 324 US. 786, 65 S. Ct. 989, 89 L. Ed.
1367 (1945); Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672, 68 S. Ct. 1270, 92 L. Ed. 1647 (1948); Uveges v
Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437, 69 S. Ct. 184, 93 L. Ed. 127 (1948).
s' Townsend v Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 68 S. Ct. 1252, 92 L. Ed. 1690 (1948); Palmer v. Ashe
342 6.S. 142, 72 S. Ct. 191, 96 L. Ed. 154 (1951); Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105, 75 S. Ct.
145, 99 L. Ed. 135 (1954).
Gibbs v Burke, 337 U.S. 773, 69 S. Ct. 1247, 93 L. Ed. 1686.
23White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760, 65 S. Ct. 978, 89 L. Ed. 1348.
24 Palmer v. Ashe, 342 U.S. 142, 72 S. Ct. 191, 96 L. Ed 154 (1951).
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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Evidence: Admissibility of Evidence Obtained Through Illegal
Searches and Seizures
By JAMES F. CULVER, Student, University of Denver, College of Law.
A recently decided California case would seem worthy
of notice among members of the legal profession in Colorado, since
upon facts very similar to those of a leading Colorado case the
Supreme Court of California, after extensive consideration of the
Colorado case, arrived at a contrary result.
The California decision referred to is People v. Cahan,1 which
was decided April 27, 1955, and which by a four to three majority reversed a lower court conviction of Cahan and other defendants charged with conspiring to engage in horse-race bookmaking and related offenses. Most of the evidence introduced at
the trial was obtained by police officers in violation of the United
States Constitutional guarantees against unreasonable searches
and seizures.
With permission of the Chief of the Los Angeles Police Department and without further authority, officers of that Department surreptitiously entered two houses and installed listening
devices therein by means of which the officers were able to make
recordings of all audible activities transpiring within the houses.
The officers in question purported to act under Sec. 653h of the
California Penal Code which provides as follows:
Any person who, without consent of the owner, lessee,
or occupant, installs or attempts to install or use a dictograph in any house, room, apartment, tenement, office,
shop, warehouse, store, mill, barn, stable, or other building, tent, vessel, railroad car, vehicle, mine or any underground portion thereof, is guilty of a misdemeanor;
provided that nothing herein shall prevent the use and
installation of dictographs by a regular salaried peace officer expressly authorized thereto by the head of his office
or department or by a district attorney when such use and
installation are necessary in the performance of their
duties in detecting crime and in the apprehension of
criminals.
Furthermore, numerous forcible entries and seizures were
candidly admitted at the trial by the officers as the means whereby additional evidence tending to establish the guilt of defendants
was obtained.
The central question in the case was whether or not evidence
illegally obtained by state officers is admissable in a state court
against defendants on trial for violations of state criminal laws.
Mr. Justice Traynor, writing for the majority of the Court, disposed of the prosecution's claim that the California Penal Code
authorized the acts of the police officers by commenting as follows:
"Sec. 653h of the Penal Code does not and could not authorize
1282

P. 2d 905 .....
Calif.
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violations of the Constitution, and the proviso under which the
officers purported to act at most prevents their conduct from constituting a violation of that section itself."
In a well-reasoned and extremely persuasive opinion, Mr. Justice Traynor further concluded that evidence obtained in violation
of constitutional guarantees against unreasonable searches and
seizures was inadmissable in the prosecution of defendants for the
violation of state laws.
The Colorado case referred to as being similar on its facts but
in which the Colorado Supreme Court reached a contrary result
is Wolf v. People.-'
In the Wolf case, representatives of the district attorney's office, having no information concerning an abortion on one Mildred
Cairo, but possessed of information concerning a similar one committed on another woman and the connection of defendant Wolfe
therewith, went to Wolfe's office without a warrant of any kind
and took him into custody and at the same time confiscated and
removed from his office certain records of patients who consulted
Wolfe professionally, which records were subsequently used as
evidence in Wolfe's trial on charges of having committed a criminal abortion on Mildred Cairo.
The Colorado Supreme Court upheld Wolfe's conviction, saying that the point is well-settled in Colorado that evidence obtained by means of unreasonable searches and seizures is admissable in a prosecution in a state court for a state crime.
The Wolfe decision was considered by the United States Supreme Court in 1949, and that Court refused to disturb the ruling
of the Colorado Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Frankfurter declaring
that in a prosecution in a state court for a state crime the 14th
Amendment does not forbid the admission of evidence obtained by
an unreasonable search and seizure.
The Wolfe decision, of course, follows the traditional common
law doctrine that the fact that evidence was illegally obtained is
not a ground for exclusion. A slight majority of the states, even
today, adhere to this doctrine.'
8

117 Colo. 279, 187 P. 2d, 926.
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
on Evidence 291 (1954).

4 McCormick
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On the other hand, the Federal rule, or so-called "Weeks doctrine," is that in a federal prosecution the 4th Amendment bars
the use of evidence secured through an illegal search and seizure. 5
It is interesting to note that prior to People v. Cahan supra,
the rule that illegally obtained evidence was admissable in state
courts was equally if not more firmly established in California
than it is in Colorado today.6 Not only was the non-exclusionary
rule well-settled in California, but furthermore, the rule of the
Wolf case that the 14th Amendment does not require the exclusion
of evidence obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure was
reaffirmed by the United States Supreme Court in disposing of a7
California case just the year before the decision in the Cahan case.
However, in doing so Mr. Justice Clark of the United States Supreme Court declared, "Perhaps strict adherence to the tenor of
(the Wolf) decision may produce needed converts for its extinction.""
Even before the Cahan decision more than two-fifths of the
states had aligned themselves either by decision or by legislation,
in general agreement with the Weeks doctrine of excluding eviguarantees against
dence secured in violation of constitutional
unreasonable searches and seizures.6 A total of twenty states are
today in general accord with the Weeks doctrine: California, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Michigan,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, North Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Washington, West Virginia,. Wisconsin, and
Wyoming. 10
When Mr. Justice Clark declared in the Irvine case, supra,
that strict adherence to the tenor of the Wolf decision might perhaps produce needed converts for its extinction, it may very well
be that the learned justice did not anticipate such prompt conversion as that demonstrated by the Supreme Court of California in
the Cahan case. Nevertheless, as Professor McCormick has put it,
"the tide seems to be flowing in that direction.""' Under the circumstances and in light of the Cahan case, who can say that the
non-exclusionary rule is so well settled in Colorado that our Supreme Court may not one day in the foreseeable future reexamine
its present position on the question and itself join the ranks of
those "needed converts" for the extinction of the Wolf decision?
'Weeks v. U.S., 232 U.S., 383 (1914).
People v. Le Doux, 155 Cal. 535, 102 P. 517 (1909); People v. Mayen, 188 Cal. 237, 205 P.
435. 24 A.L.R. 1383 f1922); Peocle v. Gonzrles, 20 Col. 2d. 165, 124 P. 2d. 44 (1942); People v. Kelley,
22 Cal. 9d 169, 137 P2d 1 (1943); and People v. Haeussler, 41 Cal. 2d 252, 260 P2d 8 (1953).
7 Irvine v. People of Calif., 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
Ibid.
'McCormick on Evidence 295 (1954).
10Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949); McCormick on Evidence 295 (1954); People v. Cohan,
Calif.. 282 P 2d. 905 (1955).
" McCormick on Evidence 295 (1954).

